

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INDEX

SI. NO.	TOPIC	PAGE NO.
1.	BASIC CONCEPTS	1-22
2.	INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND COLD WAR	23-28
3.	UN SYSTEM AND CONCEPTS	29-50
4.	NUCLEAR WORLD	51-69
5.	FOREIGN POLICY of INDIA	70-84
6.	INDIA AND PAKISTAN	85-92
7.	INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS	93-105
8.	INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONS	106-114
9.	INDIA-AFGANISTAN	115-128
10.	INDIA-SRI LANKA RELATIONS	129-137
11.	INDIA-BHUTAN RELATIONS	138-142
12.	INDIA-MALDIVES	143-147
13.	CHINA	148-166
14.	LOOK EAST POLICY OF INDIA	167-196
15.	INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS	197-209
16.	INDIA-AUSTRALIA RELATIONS	210-216
17.	INDIA'S LOOK WEST POLICY	217-239
18.	INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS	240-248
19.	CENTRAL ASIAN REGION	249-265
20.	INDIA AFRICA	266-274
21.	RUSSIA	275-282
22.	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	283-298
23.	REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	299-318
24.	NON-RESIDENT INDIAN (NRI)	319-328

BASIC CONCEPTS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The term 'international relations' is exclusive of course, it does represent a widening of our concern from simply the political relations between nation-states, but it still restricts our focus to inter-national relations, whereas we think that relations between, say, cities and other governments or international organizations can be equally important to what states do. So we prefer to characterize the relations we are interested in as those of world politics, with the important provision. One obvious example concerns the relationship between politics and economics; there is clearly an overlap, and a lot of bargaining power goes to the person who can persuade others that the existing distribution of resources is 'simply' economic rather than a political issue. Our focus is with the patterns of political relations, defined broadly, that characterize the contemporary world. Many will be between states, but many, perhaps most, will not.

World politics in this globalized world. There is considerable dispute over just what it means to talk of this being an era of globalization, and whether that means that the main features of world politics are any different from those of previous eras. In this Introduction we want to explain how we propose to deal with the concept of globalization and offer some arguments in favor of seeing it as an important new development in world politics and also some arguments against such a view. Before turning to look at globalization in order to set the scene for that follow, we want to do two things. We will first say something about the various terms used to describe global politics, and then we will spend some time looking at the main ways in which global politics has been explained. We need to do this because our aim in this Introduction is not to put forward one view of how to think about globalization. Our central concern is to point out that the main theoretical accounts of world politics all see globalization differently. Some treat it as nothing more than a temporary phase in human history, and one which does not mean that we need to fundamentally rethink how we understood world politics. Others see it as but the latest manifestation of the growth of Western capitalism and modernization and some see it as representing a fundamental transformation of world politics, one that requires new ways of understanding. International relations are the traditional names used to describe the kinds of interactions and processes. 'World politics' is that we think it is more inclusive than either of the alternative terms. It is meant to denote the fact that our interest is in the politics political patterns in the world, and not only those between nation states we are interested in relations between organizations that may or may not be states (such as, for example, multinational companies, terrorist groups, or human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); these are all known as transnational actors).

International Relations and Globalization

Its theoretical perspectives Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism, have tended to be the main theories that have been used to understand world politics, with Constructivism becoming increasingly influential since the mid-1990s. Each seems to be particularly good at explaining some aspects of world politics better than the others, and an obvious temptation would be to try to combine them into some overall account. This is because the four theories are not so much different views of the same world, but are instead four views of different worlds.

- Realism on the power relations between states,
- Liberalism on a much wider set of interactions between states and non-state actors,
- Marxist theory on the patterns of the world-economy, and
- Constructivism on the ways in which we can develop different social structures and processes.

Each view is claiming that it is picking out the most important features of world politics and that it offers a better account than do the rival theories. Constructivism suggests that actors do not face a world that is fixed, and thus it is one that they can in principle change in direct contrast to the core belief of Realists and Marxists alike.

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

The old power politics model of international relations becomes outmoded. Force becomes less usable, states have to negotiate with other actors to achieve their goals, and the very identity of the state as an actor is called into question. Walt Rostow (1960), who argued that economic growth followed a pattern in all economies as they went through industrialization. Their economies developed in the shadow of more 'developed' economies until they reached the stage where they were capable of self-sustained economic growth. What this has in common with globalization is that Rostow saw a clear pattern to economic development, one marked by stages which all economies would follow as they adopted capitalist policies. There was an automaticity to history that globalization theory also tends to rely on. There was the important literature emerging out of the Liberal paradigm discussed above. Specifically, there were very influential works on the nature of economic interdependence (Cooper 1968), the role of transnational actors (Keohane and Nye 1977), and the resulting cobweb model of world politics (Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert 1976). Much of this anticipates the main theoretical themes of globalization, although again it tends to be applied much more to the developed world than is the case with globalization. There are not able similarities between the picture of the world painted by globalization and that portrayed in Marshall McLuhan's (1964) influential work on the global village.

Globalization as a process characterized by:

- a stretching of social, political, and economic activities across political frontiers so that events, decisions, and activities in one region of the world come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe. Civil wars and conflict in the world's poorest regions, for instance, increase the flow of asylum seekers and illegal migrants into the world's affluent countries;
- the intensification, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness, in almost every sphere of social existence from the economic to the ecological,
- the accelerating pace of global interactions and processes as the evolution of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the rapidity or velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information, capital, and technology move around the world.

The growing extensity, intensity, and velocity of global interactions is associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global in so far as local events may come to have global consequences and global events can have serious local consequences, creating a growing collective awareness or consciousness of the world as a shared social space, that is globality or globalism.

Rather than growing interdependence between discrete bounded national states, or internationalization as the sceptics refer to it, the concept of globalization seeks to capture the dramatic shift that is underway in the organization of human affairs: from a world of discrete but interdependent national states to the world as a shared social space. The concept of globalization therefore carries with it the implication of an unfolding process of structural change in the scale of human social and economic organization. Rather than social, economic, and political activities being organized primarily on a local or national scale today, they are also increasingly organized on a transnational or global scale.

In an era of instantaneous real-time global communication and organization, the distinction between the domestic and the international, inside and outside the state breaks down. Territorial borders no longer demarcate the boundaries of national economic or political space. A 'shrinking world' implies that sites of power and the subjects of power quite literally may be continents apart. Under these conditions the location of power cannot be disclosed simply by reference to local circumstances.

THEORIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

REALISM

For Realists (sometimes termed 'structural Realists' or 'Neorealists', as opposed to the earlier 'classical Realists') the international system is defined by anarchy-the absence of a central authority (Waltz) states are sovereign and thus autonomous of each other; no inherent structure or society can emerge or even exist to order relations between them. They are bound only by forcible coercion or their own consent. In such an anarchic system, state power is the key-indeed, the only-variable of interest, because only through power can States defend themselves and hope to survive.

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

Realism can understand power in a variety of ways-eg militarily, economically, diplomatically-but ultimately emphasizes the distribution of coercive material capacity as the determinant of international politics.

This vision of the world rests on four assumptions (Mearsheimer 1994). First, Realists claim that survival is the principal goal of every State. Foreign invasion and occupation are thus the most pressing threats that any State faces. Even if domestic interests, strategic culture, or commitment to a set of national ideals would dictate more benevolent or co-operative international goals, the anarchy of the international system requires that States constantly ensure that they have sufficient power to defend themselves and advance their material interests necessary for survival. Second, Realists hold States to be rational actors. This means that, given the goal of survival, States will act as best they can in order to maximize their likelihood of continuing to exist. Third, Realists assume that all States possess some military capacity, and no State knows what its neighbors intend precisely. The world, in other words, is dangerous and uncertain. Fourth, in such a world it is the Great Powers-the States with most economic clout and, especially, military might, that are decisive. In this view international relations is essentially a story of Great Power politics. Realists also diverge on some issues. So-called offensive Realists maintain that, in order to ensure survival, states will seek to maximize their power relative to others (Mearsheimer 2001). If rival countries possess enough power to threaten a State, it can never be safe. Hegemony is thus the best strategy for a country to pursue, if it can.

LIBERALISM

Liberalism makes for a more complex and less cohesive body of theory than Realism. The basic insight of the theory is that the national characteristics of individual States matter for their international relations. This view contrasts sharply with both Realist and Institutionalism accounts, in which all States have essentially the same goals and behaviours (at least internationally)-self-interested actors pursuing wealth or survival. Liberal theorists have often emphasized the unique behaviour of liberal States, though more recent work has sought to extend the theory to a general domestic characteristics-based explanation of international relations. One of the most prominent developments within liberal theory has been the phenomenon known as the democratic peace (Doyle). First imagined by Immanuel Kant, the democratic peace describes the absence of war between liberal States, defined as mature liberal democracies. Scholars have subjected this claim to extensive statistical analysis and found, with perhaps the exception of a few borderline cases, it to hold (Brown Lynn-Jones and Miller). Less clear, however, is the theory behind this empirical fact. Theorists of international relations have yet to create a compelling theory of why democratic States do not fight each other. Moreover, the road to the democratic peace maybe a particularly bloody one; Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have demonstrated convincingly that democratizing States are more likely to go to war than either autocracies or liberal democracies.

Andrew Moravcsik has developed a more general liberal theory of international relations, based on three core assumptions: (i) individuals and private groups, not States, are the fundamental actors in world politics Non-State Actors; (ii) States represent some dominant subset of domestic society, whose interests they serve; and (iii) the configuration of these preferences across the international system determines State behaviour (Moravcsik). Concerns about the distribution of power or the role of information are taken as fixed constraints on the interplay of socially-derived State preferences.

In this view States are not simply 'black boxes' seeking to survive and prosper in an anarchic system. They are configurations of individual and group interests who then project those interests into the international system through a particular kind of government. Survival may very well remain a key goal. But commercial interests or ideological beliefs may also be important.

Liberal theories are often challenging for international lawyers, because international law has few mechanisms for taking the nature of domestic preferences or regime-type into account. These theories are most useful as sources of insight in designing international institutions, such as courts, that are intended to have an impact on domestic politics or to link up to domestic institutions. The complementary-based jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a case in point; understanding the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity in terms of the domestic structure of a government-typically an absence of any checks and balances-can help lawyers understand why complementary jurisdiction may have a greater impact on the strength of a domestic judicial system over the long term than primary jurisdiction (International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, Complementarily and Jurisdiction).

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism is not a theory, but rather an ontology. A set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and agency. Its counterpart is not Realism, Institutionalism, or Liberalism, but rather Rationalism. By challenging the rationalist framework that undergirds many theories of international relations, Constructivists create constructivist alternatives in each of these families of theories.

In the Constructivist account, the variables of interest to scholars-eg military power, trade relations, international institutions, or domestic preferences-are not important because they are objective facts about the world, but rather because they have certain social meanings (Wendt 2000). This meaning is constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which scholars must understand if they are to explain States behaviour. For example, Constructivists argue that the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and China, though comparably destructive, have very different meanings to the United States that translate into very different patterns of interaction (Wendt 1995). To take another example, Iain Johnston argues that China has traditionally acted according to Realist assumptions in international relations, but based not on the objective structure of the international system but rather on a specific historical strategic culture.

A focus on the social context in which international relations occur leads Constructivists to emphasize issues of identity and belief (for this reason Constructivist theories are sometimes called ideational). The perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and out-groups, fairness and justice all become key determinant of a State's behaviour. While some Constructivists would accept that States are self-interested, rational actors, they would stress that varying identities and beliefs belie the simplistic notions of rationality under which States pursue simply survival, power, or wealth.

Constructivism is also attentive to the relief social norms in international politics. Following March and Olsen, Constructivists distinguish between a 'logic of consequences'-where actions are rationally chosen to maximize the intention of a State-and 'logic of appropriateness', where rationality is heavily mediated by social norms.

For example, Constructivists would argue that the norm of State sovereignty has profoundly influenced international relations, creating a predisposition for non-interference that precedes any cost-benefit analysis States may undertake. These arguments fit under the Institution a list rubric of explaining international co-operation, but based on constructed attitudes rather than the rational pursuit of objective interests.

Perhaps because of their interest in beliefs and ideology, Constructivism has also emphasized the role of non-State actors more than other approaches. For example, scholars have noted the role of transnational actors like NGo or transnational corporations in altering State beliefs about issues like the use of land mines in war or international trade. Such 'norm entrepreneurs' are able to influence State behaviour through rhetoric or other forms of lobbying, persuasion, and . Constructivists have also noted the role of international institutions as actors in their own right. While Institution a list theories, for example, see institutions largely as the passive tools of States, Constructivism notes that international bureaucracies may seek to pursue their own interests (eg free trade or human rights protection) even against the wishes of the States that created them (Barnett and Finnemore).

NEOREALISM OR STRUCTURAL REALISM

Neorealism derives from classical realism except that instead of human nature, its focus is predominantly on the anarchic structure of the international system. States are primary actors because there is no political monopoly on force existing above any sovereign. While states remain the principal actors, greater attention is given to the forces above and below the states through levels of analysis or structure-agency debate. The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state with individuals below the level of the state acting as agency on the state as a whole. While neorealism shares a focus on the international system with the English School, neorealism differs in the emphasis it places on the permanence of conflict. To ensure state security, states must be on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up.

- Prominent neorealists:
- Robert J. Art - neoreaiism
- Robert Jervis - defensive realism
- Kenneth Waltz - structural realism

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

- Stephen Walt - defensive realism
- John Mearsheimer - offensive realism
- Robert Gilpin - hegemonic theory

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Neoclassical Realism can be seen as the third generation of realism, coming after the classical authors of the first wave (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes), and the neorealists (esp. Kenneth Waltz). Its designation of “neoclassical”, then, has a double meaning:

1. It offers the classics a renaissance;
2. It is a synthesis of the neorealist and the classical realist approaches.

Gideon Rose is responsible for coining the term in a book review he wrote. The primary motivation underlying the development of neoclassical realism was the fact that neorealism was only useful to explain political outcomes (classified as being ‘theories of international politics’), but had nothing to offer about particular states’ behavior (or ‘theories of foreign policy’). The basic approach, then, was for these authors to “refine, not refute, Kenneth Waltz”, by adding domestic intervening variables between systemic incentives and a state’s foreign policy decision.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Domestic perception of the system and or domestic incentives (intervening variable) Foreign policy decision (dependent variable) While neoclassical realism has only been used for theories of foreign policy so far, Randall Schweller notes that it could be useful to explain certain types of political outcomes as well. Neoclassical realism is particularly appealing from a research standpoint because it still retains a lot of the theoretical rigor that Waltz has brought to realism, but at the same time can easily incorporate a content-rich analysis, since its main method for testing theories is the process tracing of case studies.

Prominent neoclassical realists:

- Randall Schwe Iler
- Thomas J. Christensen
- William Wohlforth
- Aaron Friedberg
- Norrin Ripsman
- Tom Dyson

LEFT REALISM

Several scholars, including Mark Laffey at the Schorglof Oriental and African Studies, and Ronald Osborn at the University of Southern California, have argued for the idea of a “Left Realism” in IR theory with particular reference to the work of Noam Chomsky. Both Laffey and Osborn have suggested in separate articles in Review of International Studies that Chomsky’s understanding of power in the international sphere reflects the analytical assumptions of classical realism combined with radical moral, normative or “Left” critique of the state.

REALISM IN STATECRAFT

Modern realist statesmen

- Henry Kissinger
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Brent Scowcroft

The ideas behind George F. Kennan’s work as a diplomat and diplomatic historian remain relevant to the debate over American foreign policy, which since the 19th century has been characterized by a shift from the Founding Fathers’ realist school to the idealistic or Wilsonian school of international relations. In the realist tradition, security is based on the principle of a balance of power and the reliance on morality as the sole determining factor in statecraft is considered impractical. According to the Wilsonian approach, on the other hand, the spread of democracy abroad as a foreign policy is key and morals are universally valid. During the Presidency of Bill Clinton, American diplomacy reflected the Wilsonian school to such a degree that those in favor of the realist approach likened

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

Clinton's policies to social work. According to Kennan, whose concept of American diplomacy was based on the realist approach, such moralism without regard to the realities of power and the national interest is self-defeating and will lead to the erosion of power, to America's detriment.

POST-LIBERALISM

One version of post-liberal theory argues that within the modern, globalized world, states in fact are driven to cooperate in order to ensure security and sovereign interests. The departure from classical liberal theory is most notably felt in the re-interpretation of the concepts of Sovereignty and Autonomy. Autonomy becomes a problematic concept in shifting away from a notion of freedom, self-determination, and agency to a heavily responsible and duty laden concept. Importantly, autonomy is linked to a capacity for good governance. Similarly, sovereignty also experiences a shift from a right to a duty. In the global economy, International organizations hold sovereign states to account, leading to a situation where sovereignty is co-produced among 'sovereign' states. The concept becomes a variable capacity of good governance and can no longer be accepted as an absolute right. One possible way to interpret this theory, is the idea that in order to maintain global stability and security and solve the problem of the anarchic world system in International Relations, no overarching, global, sovereign authority is created. Instead, states collectively abandon some rights for full autonomy and sovereignty. Another version of post-liberalism, drawing on work in political philosophy after the end of the Cold War, as well as on democratic transitions in particular in Latin America, argues that social forces from below are essential in understanding the nature of the state and the international system. Without understanding their contribution to political order and its progressive possibilities, particularly in the area of peace in local and international frameworks, the weaknesses of the state, the failings of the liberal peace, and challenges to global governance cannot be realised or properly understood. Furthermore, the impact of social forces on political and economic power, structures, and institutions, provides some empirical evidence of the complex shifts currently underway in IR.

The standing of constructivism as an international relations theory increased after the fall of the Berlin wall and Communism in Eastern Europe as this was something not predicted by the existing mainstream theories. Constructivism or social constructivism has been described as a challenge to the dominance of neo-liberal and neo-realist international relations theories. Michael Barnett describes constructivist international relations theories as being concerned with how ideas define international structure, this structure defines the interests and identities of states and how states and non-state actors reproduce this structure. The key tenet of constructivism is the belief that "International politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities." Constructivism argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures which give meaning to the material world. The theory emerged from debates concerning the scientific method of international relations theories and theories role in the production of international power. Emanuel Adler states that constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalist and interpretative theories of international relations.

The failure of either realism or liberalism to predict the end of the Cold War boosted the credibility of constructivist theory. Constructivist theory criticises the static assumptions of traditional international relations theory and emphasizes that international relations is a social construction. Constructivism is a theory critical of the ontological basis of rationalist theories of international relations. Whereas realism deals mainly with security and material power, and liberalism looks primarily at economic interdependence and domestic-level factors, constructivism most concerns itself with the role of ideas in shaping the international system (indeed it is possible there is some overlap between constructivism and realism or liberalism, but they remain separate schools of thought). By "ideas" constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influence states and non state actors within the international system.

Constructivists believe that these ideational factors can often have far-reaching effects, and that they can trump materialistic power concerns. For example, constructivists note that an increase in the size of the US military is likely to be viewed with much greater concern in Cuba, a traditional antagonist of the US, than in Canada, a close US ally. Therefore, there must be perceptions at work in shaping international outcomes. As such, constructivists do not see anarchy as the invariable foundation of the international system, but rather argue, in the words of Alexander Wendt, that "anarchy is what states make of it". Constructivists also believe that social norms shape and change foreign policy over time rather than security which realists cite.

MARXISM AND CRITICAL THEORY

Antonio Gramsci's writings on the hegemony of capitalism have inspired Marxist international relations scholarship. Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are structuralist paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. Marxist approaches argue the position of historical materialism and make the assumption that the economic concerns transcend others; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. A sub-discipline of Marxist IR is Critical Security Studies. Gramscian approaches rely on the ideas of Italian Antonio Gramsci whose writings concerned the hegemony that capitalism holds as an ideology. Marxist approaches have also inspired Critical Theorists such as Robert W. Cox who argues that "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose".

One notable Marxist approach to international relations theory is Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system theory which can be traced back to the ideas expressed by Lenin in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of capitalism. World-system theory argues that globalized capitalism has created a core of modern industrialized countries which exploit a periphery of exploited "Third World" countries. These ideas were developed by the Latin American School. "Neo-Marxist" or "New Marxist" approaches have returned to the writings of Karl Marx for their inspiration. Key "New Marxists" include Justin Rosenberg and Benno Teschke. Marxist approaches have enjoyed a renaissance since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Criticisms of Marxists approaches to international relations theory include the narrow focus on material and economic aspects of life.

FEMINISM

Feminist approaches to international relations became popular in the early 1990s. Such approaches emphasize that women's experiences continue to be excluded from the study of international relations. International Relations Feminists who argue that gender relations are integral to international relations focus on the role of diplomatic wives and marital relationship that facilitate sex trafficking. Early feminist IR approaches were part of the "Third Great Debate" between positivists and post-positivists. They argued against what they saw as the positivism and state-centrism of mainstream international relations. Christian Reus-Smit argues that these approaches did not describe what a feminist perspective on world politics would look like.

The feminist international relations scholar Jacqui True differentiates between empirical feminism, analytical feminism and normative feminism. Empirical feminism sees women and gender relations as empirical aspects of international relations. It is argued that mainstream international relations emphasis on anarchy and statecraft mean that areas of study that make the reproduction of the state system possible are marginalized. Analytical feminism claims that the theoretical framework of international relations has a gender bias. Here gender refers not to the "biological" differences between men and women but the social constructs of masculine and feminine identity. It is claimed that in mainstream international relations masculinity is associated with objectivity. Analytical feminists would see neo-realism's dislike of domestic explanations for explaining interstate behaviour as an example of this bias. Normative feminist sees theorizing as part of an agenda for change.

CRITICISMS OF FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Feminist International Relations is sometimes oversimplified into a women's issue or simply a need to 'add women and stir'. 'Masculinities, IR and the "gender variable": a cost-benefit analysis for (sympathetic) gender sceptics' an article by Charlotte Hooper makes the case that looking at international relations through a gendered lens is important for all genders. The article illustrates that the hyper-masculinity used in international relations has a negative impact on all genders. It privileges only a certain kind of man, forcing all others to fit into the constraints of one vision of masculinity. Hooper also argues that this gendered lens requires a complete overhaul of traditional methods, rather than just adding women to the study. "In order to investigate the intersections between gender identities and international relations, one cannot rely on approaches which would take gender identities as 'givens' or as independent, externally derived variables".

Traditional methods do not meet the needs of men or women. They attempt to reduce our needs to security, failing to take into account class, education level, gender, or experience. Hooper argues that traditional studies of international relations are causing us to miss many factors for more than just women and children. To appeal to sympathetic sceptics, Hooper explains that international relations shapes masculinity in a way that affects us all. To

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

establish this she explains that masculinity and femininity are social constructs that can be influenced by theories and discourse. Hooper turns so called feminist international relations into gendered international relations, which brings in all people and highlights the importance of new methods to the field. Genders just like class, ethnicity, age, etc. can help inform our understanding of how people and nations act and if we ignore the range of masculinities and femininities we are only working with half the puzzle.

The system that Feminist International Relations is trying to subvert affects us all and influences many of our traditional theories. Hooper offers the example of war which has shaped the male body; it has created men as takers or life women as givers of it. We proceed to tell men they simply have more natural aggression. Hooper also illustrates the ways masculinity, like femininity, has been influenced by colonization. The hierarchy formed by colonization labels Asians as effeminate, Africans as savage and white men as the proper balance at the top the hierarchy. War and colonialism still influence international relations to a huge extent. It is important to realize that Feminist International Relations or a gendered lens is not just for women, but is a relevant theory that can help us all.

EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES

Evolutionary perspectives, such as from evolutionary psychology, have been argued to help explain many features of interactional relations. Humans in the ancestral environment did not live in states and likely rarely had interactions with groups outside of a very local area. However, a variety of evolved psychological mechanisms, in particular those for dealing with intergroup interactions, are argued to influence current international relations. These include evolved mechanisms for social exchange, cheating and detecting cheating, status conflicts, leadership, in group and out group distinction and biases, coalitions, and violence. Evolutionary concepts such as inclusive fitness may help explain seeming limitations of a concept such as egotism which is of fundamental importance to realist and rational choice international relations theories.

DEFINITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SOVEREIGNTY

Preceding the concepts of interdependence and dependence, international relations relies on the idea of sovereignty. Described in Jean Bodin's "Six Books of the Commonwealth in 1576, the three pivotal points derived from the book describe sovereignty as being a state, that the sovereign power(s) have absolute power over their territories, and that such a power is only limited by the sovereign's "own obligations towards other sovereigns and individuals." Such a foundation of sovereignty permits, as is indicated by a sovereign's obligation to other sovereigns, interdependence and dependence to take place. While throughout world history there have been instances of groups lacking or losing sovereignty, such as African nations prior to Decolonization or the occupation of Iraq during the Iraq War, there is still a need for sovereignty in terms of assessing international relations.

POWER

Darkest blue countries most often considered to be superpowers, dark blue countries most often considered to be great powers, pale blue countries most often considered to be middle powers, and palest blue countries also sometimes considered to be middle powers. The concept of power in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of hard power and soft power, hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics, diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power.

NATIONAL INTEREST

Perhaps the most significant concept behind that of power and sovereignty, national interest is a state's action in relation to other states where it seeks to gain advantage or benefits to itself. National interest, whether aspirational or operational, is divided by core/vital and peripheral/ non-vital interests. Core or vital interests constitute the things which a country is willing to defend or expand with conflict such as territory, ideology (religious, political, economic), or its citizens. Peripheral or non-vital are interests which a state is willing to compromise. For example, in the German annexation of the Sudeten land in 1938 (a part of Czechoslovakia) under the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was willing to relinquish territory which was considered ethnically German in order to preserve its own integrity and sovereignty.

NON-STATE ACTORS

In the 21st century, the status-quo of the international system is no longer monopolized by states alone. Rather, it is the presence of non-state actors, who autonomously act to implement unpredictable behavior to the international system. Whether it is transnational corporations, liberation movements, non-governmental agencies, or international organizations, these entities have the potential to significantly influence the outcome of any international transaction. Additionally, this also includes the individual person as while the individual is what constitutes the states collective entity, the individual does have the potential to also create unpredicted behaviors. Al-Qaeda, as an example of a non-state actor, has significantly influenced the way states (and non-state actors) conduct international affairs.

POWER BLOCS

The existence of power blocs in international relations is a significant factor which is related to Polarity. Particularly during the Cold War, the alignment of several nations to one side or another based on ideological differences or national interests has become an endemic feature of international relations. Unlike prior, shorter-term blocs, the Western and Soviet bloc's sought to spread their national ideological differences to other nations. Leaders like U.S. President Harry S. Truman under the Truman Doctrine believed it was necessary to spread democracy whereas the Warsaw Pact under Soviet policy sought to spread communism. After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the ideologically homogenous Eastern bloc still gave rise to others such as the South-South Cooperation movement.

POLARITY

Polarity in international relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multi-polar, with power being shared among Great powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had led to what some would call unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower. However, due to China's continued rapid economic growth (in 2010 it became the world's second-largest economy), combined with the respectable international position they hold within political spheres and the power that the Chinese Government exerts over their people (consisting of the largest population in the world), there is debate over whether China is now a superpower or a possible candidate in the future.

SEVERAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BASED UPON THE IDEA OF POLARITY

The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of the balance of power gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. Here, the concepts of balancing (rising in power to counter another) and bandwagoning (siding with another) are developed. Hegemonic stability theory (developed by Robert Gilpin) also draws upon the idea of polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change. This can be expressed in power transition theory, which states that it is likely that a great power would challenge a hegemon after a certain period, resulting in a major war. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A.F.K. Organski, argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese and Dutch hegemony.

INTERDEPENDENCE

Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.

DEPENDENCY

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of core states exploit a set of weaker periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability (standard dependency theory), or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change (Neo-Marxist).

Tools of international relations

- Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations.
- Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade.
- War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A widely accepted definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being “the continuation of politics by other means”. There is a growing study into ‘new wars’ involving actors other than states. The study of war in international relations is covered by the disciplines of ‘War Studies’ and ‘Strategic studies’.
- The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of international relations. This is attempting to alter states’ actions through ‘naming and shaming’ at the international level. This is mostly done by the large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (for instance when it called Guantanamo Bay a “Gulag”), or Human Rights Watch. A prominent use was the UN Commission on Human Rights 1235 procedure, which publicly exposes state’s human rights violations. The current United Nations Human Rights Council has yet to use this Mechanism
- The allotment of economic and/ or diplomatic benefits. An example of this is the European Union’s enlargement policy. Candidate countries are allowed entry into the EU only after the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.

INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International institutions form a vital part of contemporary international relations. Much interaction at the system level is governed by them, and they outlaw some traditional institutions and practices of international relations, such as the use of war (except in self-defence).

GENERALIST INTER-STATE ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization that describes itself as a “global association of governments facilitating co-operation in international law, international security, economic development, and social equity”; It is the most prominent international institution. Many of the legal institutions follow the same organizational structure as the UN.

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an international organization consisting of 57 member states. The organisation attempts to be the collective voice of the Muslim world and attempts to safeguard the interests and ensure the progress and well-being of Muslims.

Other

Other generalist inter-state organizations include:

- African Union
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- Arab League
- Commonwealth of Independent States
- European Union

- G 8
- G 20
- League of Nations
- Organization of American States

Economic institutions

- Asian Development Bank
- African Development Bank
- Bank of International Settlements
- Inter-American Development Bank
- International Monetary Fund
- Islamic Development Bank
- World Bank
- World Trade Organization

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BODIES

Human rights

- European Court of Human Rights
- Human Rights Committee
- Inter-American Court of Human Rights
- International Criminal Court
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
- United Nations Human Rights Council

Legal

- African Court of Justice
- European Court of Justice
- International Court of Justice
- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Regional security arrangements

- Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
- GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development
- Maritime security regime
- NATO
- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
- Union of South American Nations

STATE IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM & INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

As an exchange society with a libertarian political system, international relations forms a socio cultural field. It is a space of states and transnationally related groups and individuals. Its dimensions define world culture, stratification (wealth, power and prestige) and classes. Its medium consists of international meanings, values, and norms. Seated in this medium, its forces are generated by interests. And its dynamics comprise the conflict helix. Of all modern societies, contemporary international relations is closest to a social field. Interactions are primarily spontaneous and free market processes largely determine fundamental relations. No one plans what the society will be like. There is no overarching organizational structure which coercively commands behavior. And relations among members of the world society comprise multiple and overlapping local, regional, and international expectations dependent



INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

on the interests, capabilities, and credibilities of the parties involved. In other words, the international order is sewn together by diverse and cross-cutting balances of social powers.

Statesmen act towards goals (interests) in a context of these multiple balances; they speak out of an environment; they are restrained by a complex of rules they implicitly accept; they have finely tuned expectations about the behavior of others; they approach issues gingerly lest some balances somewhere, at some level, be upset, conflict ensues, and a new, unpredictable and possibly less desirable balance results. But statesmen are not the only actors, nor other statesmen the only concern. Indeed, who, more specifically, are the actors in the international field? The state is obviously a candidate for actor. States have status in international law as entities. They are responsible for official actions in their name; they can enter into treaties and make war; they have rights; they have defined territories and people. Of course, all this is legal fiction that has evolved among diverse societies. It is a structure of international relations widely accepted. And human actions and expectations give hard reality to this abstract legal reality of states. Nonetheless, although as with domestic corporations states are persons under the law, states do not act. They do not behave. But, they do structure and frame people's behavior.

They give meaningful-causal understanding to diverse human behaviors and simplify our apperception of them. Thus, a violent clash between several thousand on Damansky or Chenpao Island on the River Ussuri in March 15, 1969, becomes understandable as a border clash between Soviet and Chinese frontier guards as a manifestation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Power, ultimately is personal. People do assume authoritative positions in the state and act legally on its behalf; their own behavior is influenced by the development, political system, culture, geographic location, and history of the state; and they must be cognizant of the obligations and commitments made by previous authorities on behalf of the state. Moreover, they do enter into a system of international rules, procedures, and norms governing the behavior between officials presenting different states, as in the exchange of diplomats. There are therefore roles, a clustering of attitudes that share provocations by, or invocation in, the same situation and have a common goal or action associated with authoritative status and these roles tend to override personality differences. Thus, the international behavior of state officials is patterned, is structured, in a fashion understandable by reference to the attributes and relationships of states. But, people are still acting in the framework of and in reference to legal fictions.

The state is still not a living human being; it has no real personality; it does not behave; you cannot kick it. The modern state is a society controlled by a government (another legal fiction) based on an internal balance of powers among the people of a state, which defines who has authoritative status to act on behalf of the state.

While one may refer to the policy, or commitment, or conflict, of the United States, while meaning the policies, commitments, and conflicts of a specific elite, we should keep in mind that at all times individuals are acting in terms of their political, bureaucratic, societal balances of powers. Remembering this will help avoid the tendency to treat the morality of states as different from that of individuals, and to ascribe responsibility for actions and events to states, rather than to the human policy makers and actors. Especially, thinking always in terms of the individuals that make and execute policy or the power elite should help keep in mind the underlying balance of powers within states that supports and structures foreign policies and actions. So far, then, one actor in international relations is the authority—the leader or ruler—who can, according to his domestic status and power, and by international law, speak and write, promise and threaten, and make or break commitments on behalf of his state. But each state has a complex of authorities who act in its behalf: diplomats and statesmen, trade and custom officials, soldiers, legislative leaders, cabinet members, prime ministers, presidents, monarchs. Their actions are diverse and divided, sometimes contradictory. Authoritative decisions require implementation by subordinates; decisions must filter down the chain of command; lower level officials may veto by inaction or alter the decision. Therefore, from a complex of authorities ensues a complex of state-actions through complex political and organizational processes. What gives this complex coherence is a structure of foreign policies, alliances, and treaties determined at the highest authoritative level; the internal balance of powers within which authorities are imbedded; and the roles of all authorities that are framed by the state's geography, economic development, political system, culture, and so on. To therefore say a state behaves is to say that a complex of authorities acts within a direction delineated by an internal and external structure of expectations.

It is the internal structure that establishes the hierarchy and policies among the complex of authorities; it is the external structure that provides meaning and understanding to the complex of actions. Thus, we can evaluate and

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

weight a speech by the American President which claims that NATO is strong and can withstand an invasion by the Warsaw Pact versus a speech given elsewhere that same day by the Secretary of the Army who claims that NATO has become dangerously weak. Further clarification is yet required. All states are, more or less, from the perspective of international relations they are organizations whose elite have goals, foreign policies to achieve these goals, and an establishments (a complex of state organizations) to articulate these policies. Internally, they may be more spontaneous, free societies than coercively or authoritative ones. But in the state's external relations, around the rim dividing the state-society from the foreign world, elites maintain coercive control.

To move anything or anyone across this rim-to trade or travel, to emigrate or immigrate, to work or play, is of potential concern to the elite and usually requires their permission. Of this, the passport is an almost universal symbol. Externally, states are fields of expression.

The complex of actions of a complex of authorities, the complex of interests, capabilities and wills, and the complex of state attributes, give the state a behavioral direction and character that define what we mean by Soviet intentions, Chinese behavior, the Japanese attitude, American credibility, and so on. In observing the behavior of state authorities in international relations, we make sense out of the complex in the same way we do a painting. The dynamic field of lines, shapes, shades, and hues are perceptually organized into a mountain or lake or forest. Similarly, the complex field of actions of authorities within a complex of state attributes is given perceptual and cognitive coherence as the Brezhnev Doctrine, NATO, American economic aid to India, or an American presidential campaign.

In short, one kind of actor is the state-authority whose actions contribute to a field of expression locating the state in the international field. Aside from state-authorities, there are three other international actors. First, there is the individual who for personal reasons is involved in international society. Tourists, foreign students, migrants are the most obvious, but also those who correspond with foreigners, watch foreign movies, read foreign books, or purchase foreign goods are part of international relations. And so are pirates, plane hijackers, and dope smugglers who cross international boundaries.

Moreover, there are the invisible nets of travelling, transacting, communicating scientists, academics, artists, athletes, and businessmen, whose interests and activities transcend state boundaries. All help define and knit together international society.

There is the non state group, or group for short, which is involved in international relations or whose organization is cross-national. Here, multinational corporations (having foreign subsidiaries), companies with foreign investments, religious organizations like the Catholic church, associations like the International Political Science Association, political groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization, and terrorists like the Che Guevara Internationalist Brigade. Like states, groups are integrated authoritative structures and legal fictions. They may have a legal identity within domestic law (as does the corporation or church), or within domestic law be extralegal (as the Palestine Liberation Organization), or illegal (as are terrorist organizations). In any case, each group has internal law norms which establish its hierarchy and command structure, and specify who can legally (by group law) represent and commit the group in international relations. The same analysis of the state as actor applies to the group: the actions of group-authorities form a pattern within a direction given by the group hierarchy and policies. Finally, there are the various intergovernmental and non intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, which have legal identity in international relations. Like states and other groups composing the international society, international organizations are legal fictions represented by authorities who act on their behalf, usually administering rules and regulations governing state, group, and individual international relations. Thus, the international field is a complex of individuals acting in different international capacities and roles, representing different international groups, and interacting at different international levels. What provides most coherence to this complex is the state, which in international law takes precedence over all other organizations, at least within its boundaries. Indeed, for totalitarian states, the international relations of all their groups and people are integrated into state policy and rigidly controlled, including the actions of their citizens representing international organizations.

This control by the state and the complete relations between the diverse international actors can be made more coherent by the national relations into interstate, intersocietal, and interpersonal. Interstate relations are those authoritative actions, understandings, or commitments of the governmental authorities. The leaders-of one state

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

or with the governmental authorities of another state or its groups or citizens, either bilateral through international organizations. This would not only include the obvious international conferences, military aid, state visits, treaties, and the like, but also nationalizations of foreign business, expelling foreign newsmen, arresting a foreign national, applying duties to foreign goods.

Thus, any authoritative actions of a state's governmental elite against any citizen or group or another state is part of interstate relations. Inter societal relations are those authoritative actions, understandings, or commitments of the authorities of groups within one state with those groups or citizens of another state, or those relations within groups whose membership and organizations transcend states. The latter would include, for example, multinational corporations with foreign subsidiaries, the Catholic church, or international professional associations. Also, included in inter societal relations are companies selling goods to the citizens of other states, contacts between foreign firms, or a company contracting with a foreign firm. And interpersonal relations (in international relations) are those relations of or between citizens of different states acting in their personal interests. Tourists, migrants, foreign students, the international jet set, exemplify such interpersonal relations, as do a portion of international mail, telegrams, phone calls, and cross-border air and surface traffic. International relations are interpersonal, inter societal, and interstate: the international field comprises interpersonal, inter societal, and interstate behavior and attributes.

States more or less dominate these relations as they are more or less antifields. The more an antifield, the more a state will control the involvement of its groups and individuals in international relations. To picture this, consider first the three major types of state-societies. For understanding international relations, there are three spheres of power in states. One is that of the national government, which in all states is the coercive force monopolizing sphere of states. The second sphere of power is that of social groups (the family, church, corporation, institution, and so on), and the third is that of the individual's personal interests.

In the libertarian state individual interests dominate over social groups and both over the government. The state's agent, the government, is limited by human rights standing above government. These rights, such as of religion, the press, and speech, create the dominating sphere of individual powers (no social group can dominate through governmental control). No true libertarian state exists today.

The United States, West Germany, and Switzerland are perhaps the closest to it, but in each the governmental sphere encroaches on individual liberty and dominates social groups. All Western style democracies have become welfare-liberal states, with the relative spheres of individual, group, and governmental power a mix between libertarian and totalitarian states.

The welfare-liberal state is the totalitarian state, the truest manifestation of an antifield at the state level, the political elite controls the society. Most social groups are appendages of the state, and those that are independent have little autonomy. Individuals have no rights above the state; their daily lives are dictated, regulated, or channelled by the state-elite. In all communist societies, for example, the state is virtually the only employer, producer, farmer, renter, and landowner. Thus, in Figure the governmental sphere is shown to almost completely overlay that of individuals and social groups. Moreover, totalitarian state-societies are future-directed and materialist.

They are ordered by coercive power. They are sensate cultures. Therefore, social groups, such as the family and church, are weak and are shown within a smaller sphere than the individual. Finally, unlike the others the authoritarian state is dominated by social groups. The church, the caste, the tribe, the clan, or the family legitimately controls society through their adherence and representation of widely prevalent customs and norms.

Their authoritative power orders social relations within an ideational culture. Government conforms to fundamental principles and traditions, and is often controlled by a family or clan line. Monarchical and hereditary rule are the norm and actual governing is limited to enforcing and maintaining customary law and representing the state in foreign relations.

In an ideational culture, a traditional, group dominated, society; the sphere of individual power is small, as shown in Figure Individual interests are circumscribed socially by the traditional norms; politically by the authoritarian government. Not more than a century ago the traditional state and its authoritative society used to be the most prevalent form in international relations. Of the few remaining today, most in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is a


INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

good example. Although, therefore, international relations are interstate, inter societal, and inter personal, the scope of these relations depends on the type of state. For example, the relations between libertarian and totalitarian states can be interstate, inter societal, and interpersonal. But, virtually all the foreign relations of a totalitarian state are controlled by the state, including much of the foreign relations of what would be the autonomous international relations of groups and individuals in libertarian societies. Thus, the interstate relations of a totalitarian state compose nearly all its relations, while those of a libertarian state would be of small scope compared to societal and individual relations. This creates a basic asymmetry in the international relations between libertarian or welfare-liberal states and totalitarian ones, which can be readily seen from Figure. The sphere of state power is the sphere of coercion, threats, force. As the international relations between two states are dominated by interstate relations, so their relations are dominated by coercion, threats, and force.

TOTALITARIAN STATE

In the international field three types of authorities—the elite of states, domestic groups, and international organizations and individuals acting in their private interests. Each actor is, of course, a person. But when the elite of the state, international organization, or social group are acting in their authoritative roles, they represent the group's policies and LIBERTARIAN reflect its characteristics. It is the complex STATE of the international relations between these interpersonal actors and their group or personal attributes which define the international field. In other words, the international field is delineated by the behavior and attributes of the different actors.

DEFINITION OF BALANCE OF POWER



Balance of power, in international relations, is the posture and policy of a nation or group of nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as when embarking upon a policy of alliances.

A balance of power is a state of stability between competing forces. In international relations, it refers to equilibrium among countries or alliances to prevent anyone entity from becoming too strong and, thus, gaining the ability to enforce its will upon the rest. This is a common aspect of political realism, where self-preservation is a primary guiding principle. It often leads to nations forging alliances with others due to expediency rather than shared ideologies. During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact frequently operated with a balance of power in mind, fearful that “unbalancing” actions would trigger greater conflicts or even nuclear war Power can be seen as a very complicated concept within International Relations. Power in International Relations does not only refer to military might but also includes economic power, cultural power and also, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power.


INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

The term balance of power came into use to denote the power relationships in the European state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Within the European balance of power, Great Britain played the role of the “balancer,” or “holder of the balance.” It was not permanently identified with the policies of any European nation, and it would throw its weight at one time on one side, at another time on another side, guided largely by one consideration; the maintenance of the balance itself. Naval supremacy and its virtual immunity from foreign invasion enabled Great Britain to perform this function, which made the European balance of power both flexible and stable. The balance of power from the early 20th century onward underwent drastic changes that for all practical purposes destroyed the European power structure as it had existed since the end of the Middle Ages.

Prior to the 20th century, the political world was composed of a number of separate and independent balance-of-power systems, such as the European, the American, the Chinese, and the Indian. But World War I and its attendant political alignments triggered a process that eventually culminated in the integration of most of the world’s nations into a single balance-of-power system. This integration began with the World War I alliance of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The integration continued in World War II, during which the fascist nations of Germany, Japan, and Italy were opposed by a global alliance of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and China. World War II ended with the major weights in the balance of power having shifted from the traditional players in western and central Europe to just two non-European ones: the United States and the Soviet Union. The result was a bipolar balance of power across the northern half of the globe that pitted the free-market democracies of the West against the communist one-party states of eastern Europe. More specifically, the nations of western Europe sided with the United States in the NATO military alliance, while the Soviet Union’s satellite-allies in central and eastern Europe became unified under Soviet leadership in the Warsaw Pact. Because the balance of power was now bipolar and because of the great disparity of power between the two superpowers and all other nations, the European countries lost that freedom of movement that previously had made for a flexible system. Instead of a series of shifting and basically unpredictable alliances with and against each other, the nations of Europe now clustered around the two superpowers and tended to transform themselves into two stable blocs.

There were other decisive differences between the post war balance of power and its predecessor. The fear of mutual destruction in a global nuclear holocaust injected into the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union a marked element of restraint. A direct military confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies on European soil was an almost-certain gateway to nuclear war and was therefore to be avoided at almost any cost. So instead, direct confrontation was largely replaced by (1) a massive arms race whose lethal products were never used and (2) political meddling or limited military interventions by the superpowers in various ‘third World nations. Brown defines power as not just one thing but three things all working at the same time. They are; the attributes that the actor has and can use, the relationships between actors and the ability an actor has to influence others and thirdly the actors structure, when its system makes actors behave in a certain way. The first two parts of this definition of power in International Relations are most relevant to traditional International Relations such as Realism. The realist approach to power in International Relations is that power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. This is the basic force model. That an actors power depends on its attributes. The basic force model is a simple enough understanding of power in International Relations as the more attributes a state has the more power it has. However, there are problems with the basic force model. The current conflict in Afghanistan is a prime example of the problems with the basic force model. On paper the United States and the United Kingdom are two of the most powerful countries in the world, regarding military strength. Despite this they have been unable to win the war against the Taliban in nearly ten years. Their overwhelming military power has failed to achieve its objectives against a vastly outnumbered and poorly equipped opponent. Therefore, other factors must be taken into account and the basic force model does not fully describe what is power within International Relations.



POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Realism is based on the concept that individuals are selfish and power seeking and because the states are created by individuals, each state tries to pursue its own interest. State's goal is its own security and survival and state's survival is guaranteed best by power. States are seeking political, military or economic power. The international system for realists is anarchical and therefore, the state is never secure. Realists rely on balancing of power which could create more secure and less threatening system. Polarity in international relations is a description of the distribution of power. There are three types of systems: unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity and universality. The type of system depends on the distribution of power. However, even realists do not agree among themselves which system creates the most secure, stable or just world. The post-Cold War world is considered as a unipolar world, with the United States as the world hegemon. The question remains whether this unipolar system can promote long-term peace. From the current issues and conflicts in the world, one can say that it is not possible and that unipolarity is not the system for promotion of stability. In the discipline of international relations (IR), a greatpower is a state which excels in size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. These characteristics, also referred as power capabilities, assure a great power the ability to exert its economic, military, political and social influence on a global scale. The distribution of power capabilities in the international system determines the number of the great powers and, consequently, the polarity of the international system. If the great powers are more than two, the system will be multi-polar; if they are two, it will be bipolar, while systems with only one great power are considered unipolar. By the end of World War II, the multi-polar international system characterized by the pursuit of the balance of power among great powers, in a way that none of them was strong enough to predominate over others, transformed in bipolarity. The bipolar world was dominated by two opposite great powers with strong economic, military, and cultural influence on their allies. This nearly equal amount of distribution of power between the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) created an international system with no peripheries and with two different spheres of influence which resulted in stability for more than 40 years and assured peace between the two great powers and limited wars in the rest of the world. After the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the only great power of a new unipolar international system. The well defined hierarchy of power of the unipolar world allowed the US to loom largely unchallenged for many years and resulted in a peaceful and stable world.

order. This current stability, together with the precedent bipolar balance of power assured by the Mutual Assured Destruction, has been described as the longest period without war among any of the major powers. However, the recent rise of new powers such as the so-called BRIC countries - Brazil, Russia, India and China- could soon result in a return to a multi-polar international system.

MULTI-POLARITY (1815-1945)

Multipolarity is a distribution of power in which the nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic. In the multipolar era of world states competed for influence and the distribution of power was changing constantly. The Cold War period was stable because domination was shared between two superpowers. A system of multipolarity increases rivalry in world politics, the reason being that many states of similar strengths compete for power and influence. These states are often unwanted in of other states' intentions, which increases the probability of military action. Also, the power balance in this type of system is changing constantly, as a result of changing alliances. Multipolarity denotes the fundamental power structure in an international system dominated by several great powers, and is characterized by antagonism between these.

During the 20th century multi-polar international systems resulted in instability and led to two world wars in less than 50 years. The balance of power and the system of alliances of the early 20th century was swept away by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914. That event triggered World War I, a global conflict that caused the death of more than 15 million people in less than five years. After few decades, the multi-polar world emerged by World War I with a new system of alliances and the multilateral body of the League of Nations was not able to tame the totalitarian aspirations of Hitler. The German invasion of Poland in 1939 triggered World War II, the deadliest conflict of the history which resulted in millions of deaths and in the holocaust. Since the end of the World War II the world has never been multipolar again, nevertheless these historical accounts seem to indicate how multi-polarity often created an unstable and unpredictable world, characterized by shifting alliances and by the aspiration of the rising powers to change the balance of power and create a new order. These historical features of multi-polarity will likely distinguish also the future multi-polar world, in spite of its strong economic interconnection and institutionalization. History indeed has also shown how the effects on stability of a global economy and of multilateral institutions have been sometimes overestimated.

The multi-polar world at the beginning of the 20th century was highly economically interconnected and characterized by a large cross-border flows of goods, capital and people, at the point that the ratio of trade to output indicates that Britain and France are only slightly more open to trade today than they were in 1913, while Japan is less open now than then. Nevertheless, this high interconnection was swept away by World War I. Furthermore, the presence of the League of Nations did not prevent World War II; likewise, the multilateral organization of the UN has not always been effective in promoting peace and security, and membership in the European Union did not prevent European countries from having different positions and antithetic behaviors in the wake of US war in Iraq in 2003. A shifting from a well defined hierarchy of power to a great power rivalry will therefore result in a less stable world order.

BIPOLARITY (1945-89)

Bipolarity is used to denote the basic structure in the international system when it is dominated by two superpowers. This means that other states must ally themselves with one of the two major powers, which again limits their room maneuver thus result in more stable international politics. The Cold War is considered as a relatively peaceful absence of wars between the major powers. The bipolar balance of power was also a superpower rivalry between the East and the West, where fear and suspicion characterized the relationship between the two major powers, and confrontation war between the two was over The superpowers in conflicts during the in Africa and Asia battlegrounds for rivalry blocks. The total number of armed conflicts in this period was numerous. The Cold War ended after the Soviet economy had stagnated following their participation in the arms race with the USA, and also as a result of declining oil prices in the 1980s. A later attempt to introduce a market economy failed, the power of the communist party was undermined, East European countries declared independence, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and finally the world saw the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. When the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev regime, in 1991 it marked the end of the bipolar era in world politics. Bipolarity is a distribution of power in which two states have the majority of economic, military, and cultural influence internationally or regionally. Often, spheres of influence would develop. For example, in the Cold War, most Western and capitalist states would fall under the influence of

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

the USA, while most Communist states would fall under the influence of the USSR. After this, the two powers will normally maneuver for the support of the unclaimed areas.

UNIPOLARITY (1989-PRESENT)

Unipolarity in international politics is a distribution of power in which one state exercises most of the cultural, economic, and military influence. This is also called a hegemony or hyperpower.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has led to unipolarity, with the United States as the only superpower left. In the unipolar system, the world is dominated by one actor and the relationships are hierarchical. Although one state is a hegemon, it does not mean that it has absolute control over everything. Power of the hegemon still remains relative and its economic, political or social power does not transform into the ability to control all parts of the world, as world has seen in the case of the Vietnam or recent Iraq war. Problem with the unipolar system is that there are always states that do not accept the hegemon and will challenge him.

'Unipolarity is an interstate system and implies the existence of many juridically equal non-states. Unipolarity is anarchical as anarchy results from the incomplete power preponderance of the unipole. A great power cannot exert a positive control everywhere in the world. Unipolar systems possess only one great power and face no competition. If a competitor emerges, the international system is no longer unipolar. Unipolarity is peaceful because it favors the absence of war among great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states. After 1989 the US has been considered the militarily, economically and technologically leading country of the world, a lonely superpower able to impose its will on another countries and in some cases such as the 2003 war to Iraq waged without the United Nations (UN) Security Council consensus, to act outside the laws of the international community.

This unbalanced preponderance has been promoted and reinforced by some factors. The US geographic position assured the security of the country for many years: while other states—for example China, Russia and the European countries are land powers surrounded by potential enemies, the US is isolated and too far away from its potential threats. As a result, no country in the last 70 years tried to attack American soil. This geographical security is strengthened by an unchallengeable military power. According to latest data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), US military spending accounted for more than 40 per cent of the world total, followed by China with approximately 8 per cent, and Russia, United Kingdom and France with a percentage between 4 and 3.5 per cent each. US military capabilities assure it a strong sea and air power and allow it to project its force globally, enabling it to hit a target everywhere at every time. Yet the notion of hegemony does not only imply geographical security and military preponderance, but also influence and cultural hegemony. As a great power during the Cold War and as a lonely superpower in the last 20 years, the US played a key role in the architecture of the new world order. From an economic point of view, the US laid the foundations of the global liberal economic order long before the unipolar era, supporting the Bretton Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which was replaced in 1994 by the World Trade Organization, and indirectly controlling some international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Nowadays, the US controls around the 17 per cent of the total votes of the IMF and it the largest shareholder in the World Bank, leading to the tradition that the President of the World Bank has always been a US citizen nominated by the US President, while the President of the IMF has always been a European. Furthermore, the US tried to shape and set world order also politically. During the Cold War, American power supported anti communist and guerrillas in order to contrast the spread of the socialist value supplying for example; arms to non-state groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua through its regional allies. Likewise, after the USSR collapse the democratic peace or with its assertion that two democracies do not go to war each other. Behind US promotion and support of accountable liberal democracies all over the world. This unequal distribution of power and the implicit recognition of the US hegemony suited in a world characterized by no wars among the major states and the lowest number of armed conflicts of the last 50 years. Conversely, the US unipolar world has been the highest number of intrastate conflicts most of these erupted in the aftermath of the USSR dissolution. Nevertheless, the intrastate and regional character of these conflicts hardly constituted a potential danger for US hegemony, or a threat for the polarity and the stability of the world order. In the last decades, US power was thus challenged only sporadically and using asymmetric means, as happened the 11th September 2001 during the terrorist attacks to New York.

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

MULTI-STATE EXAMPLES OF BIPOLARITY

The bipolar system can be said to extend to much larger systems, such as alliances or organizations, which would not be considered nation-states, but would still have power concentrated in two primary groups.

In both World Wars, much of the world, and especially Europe, the United States and Japan had been divided into two respective spheres—one case being the Axis and Allies of World War II (1939-1945) and the division of power between the Central Powers and Allied Powers during World War I (1914-1918). Neutral nations, however, may have caused what may be assessed as an example of tripolarity as well within both of the conflicts.

NONPOLARITY

Today's world is dominated not by one or two or even several powers, but rather is influenced by dozens of state and non-state actors exercising various kinds of power. At twentieth century dominated first by a few states, then, during the Cold War, by two states, and finally by American preeminence at the Cold War's end, has given way to a twenty-first century dominated by no one. Call it non-polar. Centers of power can be nation-states, corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist groups, and such. Power is found in many hands and many places. It suffers from attempting to use liberal conceptions of power within a realist paradigm, diluting the meaning of 'polarity', and is not widely found in usual discussions of polarity. Three factors have brought this about. First, some states have gained, power in tandem with their increased economic clout. Second, globalization has weakened the role of all states by enabling other entities to amass substantial power. And, third, American foreign policy has accelerated the relative decline of the United States vis-a-vis others.

The result is a world in which power is increasingly distributed rather than concentrated. The emergence of a non-polar world could prove to mostly negative, making it more difficult to generate collective responses to pressing regional and global challenges. More decision makers make it more difficult to make decisions. Non-polarity also increases both the number and potential severity of threats, pace they rogue states, terrorist groups, or militias. Still, if non-polarity is inevitable, its character is not. A great deal can and should be done to shape the non-polar world. But order will not emerge on its own. On the contrary, left to its own devices, a non-polar world will become messier over time. Resisting the spread of nuclear weapons and unguarded nuclear materials may be as important as any other set of undertakings. If internationally managed enriched-uranium or spent-fuel banks are established, countries could gain access to nuclear power but not come to control the material needed for bombs. Security assurances and defensive systems could be provided to states that might otherwise feel compelled to develop their own nuclear programs to counter those of their neighbors. And robust sanctions could be introduced to influence the behavior of would-be nuclear weapon states. The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past. The twentieth century started out distinctly multipolar, But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity—an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse, and the onset of non polarity raises a number of important questions. How does nonpolarity differ from other forms of international order? How and why did it materialize? What are its likely consequences? And how should the United States respond?


GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics is the study the effects of geography (both human and physical) on international politics and international relations. Geopolitics is a method of foreign policy analysis which seeks to understand, explain and predict international political behaviour primarily in terms of geographical variables. Geographical variables the physical location, size, climate, topography, demography, natural resources, and technological advances of the state being evaluated. Traditionally, the term has primarily to the impact of geography on politics, but its usage has evolved over the past century to encompass wider connotations. Geopolitics traditionally studies the links between political power and geographic space, and examines strategic prescriptions based on the relative importance of land power and sea power in world geopolitical tradition had some consistent concerns with geopolitical correlations of power world politics, the identification of international core areas, and the relationships by naval and terrestrial capabilities. Academically, the study of geopolitics analyses geography, history, and social science with reference to spatial

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

politics and patterns at various scales. Also, the study of geopolitics includes the study of the ensemble of relations between the interests of international political actors, interests focused to an area, space, geographical element or ways, relations which create a geopolitical system. Geopolitics is multidisciplinary in scope, and includes all aspects of the social sciences-with particular emphasis on political geography, international relations, the territorial aspects of political science and international law. The practice directly and indirectly impacts businesses and economies. The term “Geopolitics” was coined at the beginning of the twentieth century by Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish political scientist, who was inspired by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel published Politische Geographie (political geography) in 1897; that book was later popularized in English by the Austro-Hungarian historian Emil Reich and the American diplomat Robert Strausz-Hupe (a faculty member of the University of Pennsylvania). Although Halford Mackinder had a pioneering role in the field, he never used the term geopolitics himself.

Global Governance



The West-phallian conception of sovereignty as an indivisible, territorially exclusive form of public power is being displaced by a new sovereignty regime, in which sovereignty is understood as the shared exercise of public power and authority. In this respect we are witnessing the emergence of a post-Westphallian world order. Furthermore, far from globalization leading to ‘the end of the state’, it elicits a more activist state.

This is because, in a world of global enmeshment, simply to achieve domestic objectives national governments are forced to engage in extensive multilateral collaboration and cooperation. But in becoming more embedded in frame works of global and regional governance, states confront a real dilemma: in return for more effective public policy and meeting their citizens’ demands, their capacity for self-governance-that is, state autonomy-is compromised. Today, a difficult trade-off is posed between effective governance and self-governance. In this respect, the West phalli an image of the monolithic, unitary state is being displaced by the image of the disaggregated state in which its constituent agencies increasingly interact with their counterparts abroad, international agencies, and NGOs in the management of common and global affairs(Slaughter2004)

Global politics is a term which acknowledges that the scale of political life has fundamentally altered: politics understood as that set of activities concerned primarily with the achievement of order and justice does not recognize territorial boundaries. It questions the utility of the distinction between the domestic and the foreign, inside and outside the territorial state, the national and the international since decisions and actions taken in one region impact upon the wolf are of communities in distant parts of the globe, with the result that domestic politics is internationalized and world politics becomes domesticated. It acknowledges that power in the global system is not the sole preserve of states but is distributed (unevenly) among a diverse array of public and private actors and networks (from international agencies, through corporations to NGOs) with important consequences.

INSIGHT GENERAL STUDIES

It recognizes that political authority has been diffused not only upwards to supra-state bodies, such as the European Union, but also downwards to sub-state bodies, such as regional assemblies, and beyond the state to private agencies, such as the International Accounting Standards Board. It accepts that sovereignty remains a principal juridical attribute of states but concludes that it is increasingly divided and shared between local, national, regional, and global authorities. Finally, it affirms that, in an age of globalization, national politics no longer function as closed systems. On the contrary, it asserts that all politics-understood as the pursuit of order and justice-are played out in a global context.

With globalization, inequality and exclusion are endemic features of contemporary global politics. There are many reasons for this but three factors in particular are crucial.

First, enormous inequalities of power between states; second, global governance is shaped by an unwritten constitution that tends to privilege the interests and agenda of global capitalism; third, the technocratic nature of much global decision-making, from health to security, tends to exclude many with a legitimate stake in the outcomes. These three factors produce cumulative inequalities of power and exclusion-reflecting the inequalities of power between North and South-with the result that contemporary global politics is more accurately described as distorted global politics: 'distorted' in the sense that inevitably those states and groups with greater power resources and access to key sites of global decision making tend to have the greatest control or influence over the agenda and outcomes of global politics. In short, global politics has few democratic qualities. This sits in tension with a world in which democracy is generally valued. Whether a more democratic global politics is imaginable and what it might look like is the concern of normative theorists.

Four Cs to sum up basic concepts for 'international relations' i.e areas of Convergence, Confrontation, Competition and Cooperation

Convergence :

1. Democratic form of government
2. Pluralistic societies
3. Development imperatives
4. Common problems

Confrontation :

1. Border disputes
2. Resource sharing
3. Cross border terrorism
4. IPR
5. Global environmental negotiations
6. Trade disputes

Competition :

1. Exploration and development of resources in different parts of the world
2. Role in sensitive areas
3. Geo-strategic competition

Cooperation :

1. Dealing with terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental pollution
2. Common stance on environmental negotiation forums and WTO
3. Defence and security ties
4. Trade development
5. Infrastructure development
6. Science and technology
7. Global peace and stability

